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The contractual provisions contained in Naval FPIF Ship-
building contracts determine to a large extent the impact of
inflation on contract profitability. The concern of ship-
builders regarding the inflationary erosion of profitability
is due in part to the long-term nature of shipbuilding
contracts
.
An analysis is made of the payments and escalation pro-
visions contained in fourteen major shipbuilding contracts
signed over a span of eight years. Profit profiles for
seven of these shipbuilding contracts are generated based
upon six payment thresholds. The profit profiles, when
expressed in terms of deflated dollars, present value at
15% and present value of deflated dollars at 157o show a
declining trend in profitability.
Three separate approaches for providing escalation
coverage for profit are discussed. It is recommended that
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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of
inflation on profit in Navy Fixed Price Incentive Fee ship-
building contracts. This is a current issue in the ship
acquisition process as is evident in complaints of profit
erosion raised by shipbuilders in response to recent Navy
contract solicitations. For example, a shipbuilder states
in the forwarding letter to a proposal submitted in response
to the FFG-7 Follow Ship solicitation that the exclusion of
profit from escalation coverage could erode profit as a %
of cost by 307o. The shipbuilder further asserted that
since the payment of profit is postponed to future periods
where the dollar will be worth less profit is eroded by an
additional 32%.
These are strong statements reflecting one shipbuilder's
perception of how inflation affects profit. It is not in-
tuitively obvious as to whether these statements are in
fact valid. These statements do, however, imply that
contractual provisions determine to a large degree the
assessment of the impact of inflation on profit. Therefore,
this thesis contains an examination of the relationship of

contractual provisions to the impact of inflation on the
contractor's profit.
Profit can be viewed from separate perspectives. Two
perspectives are either a "going-in" or "coming-out" basis.
"Going-in profit," also referred to as "contract profit,"
is the amount of target profit stated in the contract at
the time it is signed. "Going-in profit" can be stated in
terms of a dollar amount or as a percentage of cost. "Coming-
out profit," on the other hand, is the actual profit earned
upon completion of the contract. In this paper statements
regarding profit will refer to "going-in profit" expressed
as a % of target cost unless stated otherwise.
It is also important that the reader note the distinction
between price and cost. The price of a contract is comprised
of two separate elements; cost and profit. Therefore, any
reference to contract cost is exclusive of profit. In
negotiated contracts, profit is determined by applying a
percentage factor to contract cost. Although the government
is primarily concerned with contract price or total con-
tractor compensation, it is assumed that the distinction
made between contract cost and profit is valid on a going-
in basis.
Inflation can affect profit directly through the erosion
of purchasing power or indirectly through the contractor
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compensation methods. The analysis of the impact of infla-
tion on profit is made within the context of those con-
tractural provisions which determine contractor compensation.
The principle provisions are the escalation and payments
clauses. This paper is thus concerned with how and when
the contractor is compensated in addition to how profit is
to be measured.
The contractor has placed greater emphasis on the timing
of the receipt of profit than has the government. The ero-
sion of profit relative to the timing of profit can be
measured in three ways . One measure addresses the reduction
in purchasing power due to the increase in price levels while
the other addresses the reduction in the value of profit as
reflected by the opportunity cost associated with the receipt
of profit over time. Assuming independence these can be
combined into a third measure.
There are other factors which result in the erosion of
profit such as the disallowance of cost in accordance with
ASPR. These factors will not be included in the measurement
of profit erosion.
B. GENERAL APPROACH
In light of changes in policy regarding progress pay-
ments and escalation payments, an analysis was conducted
11

of selected contracts to determine the spectrum of pro-
visions employed in shipbuilding contracts. Profit profiles
for a subset of the selected contracts were developed based
upon projections over time of expenditures and payments
received as determined by the actual financial provisions
contained in contracts. Three measures of profit erosion
were used. Profit was measured in terms of deflated dollars,
present value at 157o and present value of deflated dollars
at 15%.
An outline of the general approach used to analyze the
impact of inflation on profit is as follows:
1. Identify the principle components of contractor
compensation such as progress payments, escalation payments,
delivery payments, etc., and review the development of
current Navy policy relevant to these components.
2. Trace Navy policy as actually implemented through
the financial provisions contained in fourteen major ship-
building contracts listed below.
3. Model the profit profile of selected contracts in
light of the observed policies and using actual and pro-
jected inflation rates.
4. Using relative measures of profit make comparisons
of the impact of inflation on profit for the contracts
modeled in step three.
12

5. Develop alternatives to minimize the adverse impacts
of inflation indicated in step four.
The following is a list of the fourteen major ship-
building contracts selected for use in this paper.




688-III 3/SSN 688 Newport
News
79 -76-C-2031
TRIDENT 3/SSBN 726 Electric
Boat
76 -75-C-2014
688-11 11/SSN 688 Electric
Boat
87 -74-C-0206
AOR-7 1/AOR 7 National
Steel
36 -73-C-0227
DLGN-38 3/DLGN 38 Newport
News
69 -70-C-0252
688-I-(EB) 7/SSN 688 Electric
Boat
78 -71-C-0268
688-I-(NN) 4/SSN 688 Newport
News
66 -71-C-0270
688-LS 1/SSN 688 Newport
News
45 -70-C-0269
DD 963 30/DD 963 Litton 96 -70-C-0275
637-(2) 2/SSN 637 Newport
News
56 -69-C-0307
LHA 9/LHA Litton 71 -69-C-0283





DLGN-36 2/DLGN 36 Newport 59 -68-C-0355
News
CVAN-68 2./CVAN 68 Newport Contingent -68-C-0325
News on delivery
of first vessel
For ease of identification, reference to contracts will
be by contract designation rather than by contract number.
Although reclassification of Naval vessels became effective
30 June 1975, the contract designation reflects the classi-'
fication contained in the initial contract. The length of
the contract listed above is based upon the delivery schedule
at the time the contract was signed. Likewise, the number
of vessels in the LHA contract is the original quantity.
Twelve of the contracts represent the major new construction
FPIF contracts listed in the Naval Sea Systems Command
Monthly Progress Report dated 1 August 1975 . The remaining
two represent contracts that have recently been completed.
C. ORGANIZATION
The organization of this paper relative to the steps
outlined in the general approach is noted below:
Chapter II contains the analysis of contractor compensa-




Chapter III - V, respectively, contain the analysis of
the escalation, payments and the cost incentive provisions
that have been contractually implemented. The tables con-
tained at the end of each of these chapters describe the
characteristics of the respective provisions contained in
each of the selected fourteen contracts. The reader should
become familiar with each table as there will be many refer-
ences made to them throughout each chapter.
Chapter VI describes the procedures used to generate
contract profit profiles.
Chapter VII contains the analysis of the profit profiles
relative to the impact of inflation.
Chapter VIII introduces potential courses of action in
light of the results obtained in Chapter VII.
The reader that is thoroughly familiar with contractural
provisions used in Navy shipbuilding contracts may begin
reading in Chapter VII where it is concluded that failure
of the Navy to address the central issue of this paper will
result in shipbuilders negotiating higher profit rates or
a continuation of the decline in interest in Navy shipbuilding,
15

II. CONTRACTOR COMPENSATION AS DETERMINED
BY NAVY POLICY
Although there are many contractual provisions of a
shipbuilding contract that affect contractor compensation
such as liquidated damages, standardization, and early
delivery incentives, compensation principally comes from








Each of these classes will be introduced in this chapter.
As each of the classes of payment is discussed specific
issues are identified. Combined with increased inflation
the result of these effects is that profit bid rates on
Navy shipbuilding contracts have noticeably increased.
A table listing profit rates bid on Navy contracts accom-
panied by a discussion regarding industry reaction to Navy




Due to the long-term nature of shipbuilding contracts,
the Navy has long been one of the major users of escalation
clauses. Escalation or economic price adjustment provisions
are explicit contractual procedures used to remove the effect
of price level changes from contract price. Professors
Sovereign and Jones in a paper entitled "Escalation Pro-
visions for Navy Contracts: Issues and Choices," theoret-
ically demonstrate that the removal of price level uncertainty
from long-term contracts through an escalation provision is
to the advantage of both parties. It should not be assumed,
however, that the use of price adjustment clauses results in
a total shift or risk relative to price level change from
the seller to the buyer. For example, the Navy, in the
acquisition of ships, uses one of the types of economic
price adjustment provided for by ASPR. It is known as the
labor and material cost index method. The adjustments in
price determined by this procedure do not provide coverage
for the escalation of profit. Since escalation provisions
do not cover profit, the extent to which escalation payments
comprise contractor compensation is indicative of the degree
to which this should be of concern.
The increased rate of price level changes experienced
since the late 60 ' s has resulted in a significant shift in
17

the percentage of total compensation paid in the form of
escalation payments. Figure I illustrates the magnitude of
this shift relative to twelve major shipbuilding contracts
signed since 1967. It can be seen that exclusive of air-
craft carrier procurement, escalation payments on multi-
vessel construction contracts signed prior to 1970 fall
within a range of 10-207o of initial contract price whereas
projected escalation payments on multi-vessel contracts
signed since 1970 fall within a range of approximately 20-
457o of initial contract price. Aircraft carrier procure-
ment represents a special case due to the extremely long
construction period. On the other hand, the multi-vessel
distinction excludes the two single-vessel contracts, AOR-7
and 688-LS. Without the multi-vessel distinction these
contracts would contradict the above statement. The dis-
tinction between the two contracts and the others is due
to their relatively short construction periods. It should
be noted, however, that even the projected percentage of
escalation payments on these two contracts exceeds that of
multi-vessel contracts such as the 637.
Figure I contains percentages based on both actual and
projected escalation payments. The contracts which are
completed for escalation purposes and thus based upon




























































































































































Chapter III, it is possible for escalation coverage to
end prior to physical completion of the contract. An
example of this situation is the LHA contract. The use of
projections of total escalation payments to substantiate
the statement above regarding the shift in composition of
contractor compensation requires an indication of the
sensitivity of total escalation to changes in projected
inflation rates.
One means of indicating the sensitivity of projected
escalation to changes in projected price levels is the
amount of escalation already incurred relative to the total
projected escalation. Table I is such a presentation.
Table I
Escalation Incurred as a Percent
of Total Projected Escalation
(Source: NAVSHIPS 7303 - 17 Reports )
CONTRACT % Escalation already
incurred
SSN 688 - II 9
AOR - 7 60
DLGN - 38 58
SSN 688 - I (EB) 48
SSN 688 - I (NN) 70
SSN 688 - LS 86
DD 963 74
CVAN - 68 90
20

Since only 9% of projected escalation has been incurred in
the 688-11 contract, it is the only contract in which the
total projected escalation payments are highly dependent
upon the estimation of future price levels.
The change in the composition of contractor compensation
has prompted comments from shipbuilders concerning profit
erosion. An example is provided by officials of Bath Iron
Works Corporation in a presentation to Deputy Secretary
of Defense Clements and CNO Admiral Holloway with regard to
the FFG Follow Ship Program. (1).
The contractor is paid no fee on escalation, even
though the contractor must assume the risk that escala-
tion recovery will, in fact, make him "whole," and
that represents a major potential cost as illustrated
in this viewgraph. This factor alone erodes fee on
cost from 13% to 9%. Therefore, we feel consideration
should be given to fee on escalation.
This position is not without precedent. The Logistics
Management Institute in a report entitled Wage Rate and
Material Price Level Adjustment Provisions in DOD Procure-
ment concludes, "...that an increment of profit on the
escalation should be included in the adjustment." (2).
Profess or s Sovereign and Jones also maintain this position.
Likewise the Council of Defense and Space Industry Associ-
ates in a letter to the Chairman of the ASPR Committee
proposed an escalation clause which provided for the adjust-
ment of costs including a negotiated profit allowance
allocated to those adjusted elements of cost. (3).
21

The Navy, in its use of escalation clauses is not uni-
form in the treatment of profit on escalation. The Commander,
Naval Ship Systems Command in a letter to the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy (I&L) concludes upon comparison of
the NAVA1R and NAVSHIPS escalation clauses that "...the
only substantial difference between the NAVAIR and NAVSHIPS
clauses lies in the fact that NAVSHIPS does not pay escala-
tion on profit or on fixed overhead whereas NAVAIR does."
(4) . The above difference principally arises from the
interpretation of the meaning of "total recognized contract
costs" within the "weighted guidelines" procedure of ASPR
as to the inclusion of normal escalation. The Chief of
Naval Material in a letter to the Commander, Naval Sea
Systems Command, regarding profit objectives on shipbuilding
contracts states: (5)
In the past the difference between profit
objectives computed with and without including
normal escalation in the 'total recognized contract
costs' was probably within a reasonable range of
variance resulting from the judgmental application
of weight ranges in the profit factors used. How-
ever, with the advent of increasing lead times and
higher rates of economic escalation, the amounts
of normal escalation have increased to the point
where, some consideration should be given to in-
cluding them in recognized costs.
Accordingly, it is requested that the issue be
evaluated and a NAVSEA position with supporting
rationale be forwarded to the Chief of Naval Material
by 30 April 1975.
22

The NAVSEA response to this request is included as Appendix
A of this paper. Indicative of additional high-level con-
cern on the subject of consideration of inflation in FPI
and CPIF contracts is a memorandum to the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Procurement), the Director of Procurement,
Office of the ASSTSECNAY (I&L) states: (6)
The effect of inflation on contractor profit
under CPIF and FPI contracts warrants a detailed
review of data on contractor cost experience. This
subject is properly a subject of the 'Profit-76'
study being performed by your office. It is
recommended that the profit study examine data on
contractor profit experience as a result of infla-
tion on CPIF and FPI contracts.
The uncertainty reflected in the above statement as to
the impact of escalation provisions on "coming-out profit,"
stems primarily from the artificial nature of their approach
to the measurement of price level changes. Artificial in
this context refers to the separation between the method
of determining escalation payments and the actual cost
experience of the contractor. This will be explained further
in Chapter III. Due to this artificial nature, Secretary
Bowers, ASN (I&L), proposed that the Chief of Naval Material
establish a set of objectives for an optimum escalation
system. (7) . The increased rate of price level change
combined with longer lead times encountered in the ! 70's
led to a situation in which escalation provisions were
23

deemed inadequate by most shipbuilders. The primary reason
for this contention was that the provisions did not provide
protection beyond target cost and target schedule. The LMI
Report had addressed these issues in 1968. Likewise, the
Navy Marine Corps Acquisition Review Committee (NMARC) , in
its January 1975 report, addressed the issue of economic
escalation. The NMARC Cost Panel in Recommendation COST -
66 stated: (8)
The Navy should complete MAT-02's effort to
develop escalation clauses for shipbuilding contracts
that will provide protection to contractors for
economic escalation. Recognition must be given to
the fact that these clauses must have the basic flexi-
bility to be modified as required to suit the particular
circumstances of various types of procurements. These
clauses should provide for divorcing the effect of
escalation from the basic risk-sharing arrangements
of fixed-price-incentive-fee (FPIF) contracts by pro-
viding protection to ceiling. They should also con-
sider extending the application to cost-type contracts.
In addition, it would appear necessary for the Navy to
encourage the flowdown of escalation provisions to
subcontractors when the prime contractor has such
protection.
The result of MAT-02's effort culminated in a fundamental
change in the method of providing for escalation coverage.
As will be noted later, this method was first utilized in
the 688-III (third flight) contract. Escalation provisions




The largest portion of shipbuilding contractor compensa-
tion is in progress payments. In recognition of delayed
delivery payments under long-term construction contracts,
ASPR-E-501 exempts shipbuilding from the usual E-500 require-
ments and authorizes the use of progress payments based on
physical progress. Under physical progress payments the
shipbuilding industry was able to receive up to a maximum
of 1057o of cost while other production industry contractors
were limited to progress payments based upon 80/857o of cost.
This difference provided the basis for complaints of prefer-
ential predelivery financing of the shipbuilding industry.
However, in the summer of 1971, there occurred two events
which have had a significant impact upon Navy policy regard-
ing shipbuilding progress payments.
First, the Report of the Industry Advisory Council Sub-
committee to Consider Defense Industry Financing dated
11 June 1971, recommended that an in-depth study be con-
ducted of progress payments based upon a percentage or
stage-of -completion. Second, was VADM Rickover's memorandum
of 14 July 1971 to the ASN (I&L) criticizing existing pro-
gress payment policies and practices. He stated that
Newport News was receiving progress payments far greater
25

than it needed to meet its cash outlays and that they had
increased their cash surplus. by taking advantage of loop-
holes in the Navy's progress payments process. The excess
of progress payments over costs on Newport News shipbuilding
contracts as of 9 July 1972 was cited as $9.2 million. Such
practices as paying subcontractors progress payments at only
907o of the amount billed the Navy and changing the method
of calculating progress payments during the DLGN-36 contract
were listed as examples of exploitation of loopholes in the
progress payment process. In the latter instance it was
stated that Newport News was able to claim additional pro-
gress payments of about $3 million, when under the old
method they would have had to refund $900,000 in overpay-
ments. Although the mechanics of the progress payments
procedure will be discussed in a later section, it is of
interest to note that the Deputy Chief of Naval Material
(Procurement and Production) defended the additional progress
payments to Newport News as funds to which the contractor
was entitled to under the terms of the contract. In a
memorandum to the ASN (I&L) he stated that the contractor
had been under-billing as a result of a mistake in calcula-
tion of his entitlement for escalation and that DCAA had
concurred in the revised method. (9) . Further review of
this matter led to an eventual reversal of this position.
26

The most immediate impact of VADM Rickover's memorandum
was a NAVMAT requirement that the Contract Finance Committee
approve of any contract provision permitting progress pay-
ments in excess of 807o. The longer range impact was that
the charter of the Task Group to Study Shipbuilding Progress
Payments incorporated the essence of the memorandum in its
areas for inquiry and examination. The Deputy Comptroller
of the Navy in a memorandum to the Task Group, highlighted
Navy policy regarding progress payments as follows: (10).
A basic premise to the study is that progress
payments or predelivery payments made by the Govern-
ment are for the purpose of providing working
capital for contract performance. This is a
principle accepted by the Industry Advisory Council
and is consistent with the views within the Depart-
ment of Defense. By contrast, progress payments
are not for the purpose of financing capital
investment, not specifically included in the con-
tract such as: land, buildings and equipment or
to abate the payment of interest on contractor
borrowings as an indirect means of bolstering
profits
.
The Task Group, in the summary of their report, stated
the method of providing progress payments on shipbuilding
contracts did not: (11).
1. Provide an accurate measure which can be
efficiently and effectively administered,
2. Require contractors to have a positive
investment in shipbuilding contracts,
3. Provide equal treatment with respect to
the manner in which progress is measured,
27

4. Provide comparable treatment for shipbuilding
contracts and other supply type contracts.
The Task Group recommended a cost-based method of making
progress payments which introduced ASPR-E-500 constraints
upon the shipbuilding industry. The proposed method was
the same as that used with supply, aerospace and other non-
construction industry contractors with the exception that
seven additional interim payments based upon milestones of
accomplished performance were to be included. In response
to the Draft Report of the Task Group, the Commander, Naval
Ships Systems Command stated: (12).
I am much concerned over the effect that the
proposed change in our system of progress payments
will have on the ship acquisition process. Un-
doubtedly, the extra costs of financing will
result in higher costs for ship construction and
conversion.
He proposed instead a continuation of the system based upon
physical progress with a limitation of 95% of costs incurred
in lieu of the 105?o limitation. As illustrated in the re-
port, a comparison of the financing provided by using the
Task Group proposal with using progress payments based on
957o of incurred costs revealed the two methods to be quite
similar in results. The Naval Ships Systems Command pro-
posal was not tantamount to a rejection of the premise
upon which the Task Group recommendations were based, but
28

rather reflected administrative considerations in light of
the contract administration process.
On 15 March 1973 the recommendations of the Task Group
were implemented in SECNAVINST 7810.11 with the intent to
equalize the progress payments received by shipbuilders
with those received by other defense contractors and to
increase the shipbuilder's investment in work-in-process.
As will be illustrated in the section on progress payments,
the Navy was unsuccessful in imposing this payment method
in any major new construction contracts. New construction
contracts signed subsequent to the issuance of this in-
struction provided for continued use of payments based on
physical progress with total payment limited to 957o of
incurred costs as provided by the Commander, Naval Ships
Systems Command. The validity of the comparison made by
the Task Group was questioned in light of the extremely
negative nature of the objections to SECNAVINST 7810.11
by the shipbuilding industry regarding the projected impact
upon cash flow. An analysis of this matter by NAVMAT indi-
cated that the method of SECNAVINST 7810.11 provided a
lower level of progress payments than the 807o progress
payments under supply type contracts. (13).
The Navy Marine Corp Acquisition Review Committee
(NMARC) also studied the problems in the area of the
29

shipbuilding cash flow/progress payments. In their report
they made, along with others, the following recommendation:
(8).
The effectiveness of SECNAV Instruction 8710.11
in its present form is questionable in the judgment
of the Panel. The current Navy study should be
completed; policies for financing, contractor in-
vestment, and profit should be defined; and modifi-
cation of SECNAV Instruction 7810.11 should be
effected to achieve practices that are equitable
and realistic in view of the current economic
environment.
The Director of Banking and Contract Financing, in a
memorandum to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, (Finan-
cial Management) called the timing of SECNAVINST 7810.11
inappropriate. He stated that the long-term effect would
be either in ship price or a further diminution in oppor-
tunity for profits (due to the regulation prohibiting the
cost of borrowed funds as an expense item for work on
Government contracts) . Concluding that neither ship price
increase nor profit diminution was desirable, he recommended
that SECNAVINST 7810.11 be recinded and that progress pay-
ments based upon physical progress be continued. (14)
.
On 17 July 1975 SECNAVINST 7810.11 was cancelled by
SECNAVINST 1810.12 authorizing progress payments based upon
a percentage-of -completion for fixed price and fixed price
incentive shipbuilding contracts. This essentially was a
modified version of the previous long established method of
30

progress payments V7ith an explicit treatment of incurred
costs. Payments provisions will be analyzed in detail in
Chapter IV.
C. DELIVERY AND GUARANTEE PAYMENTS
Delivery and guarantee payments, like progress payments,
are covered by the payments article of a shipbuilding con-
tract. The delivery payment is made upon preliminary
acceptance of a vessel while the guarantee or performance
reserve payment is made after the guarantee period. Gener-
ally the guarantee period is six months after completion of
the fitting out period or eight months after preliminary
acceptance. The Task Group to Study Shipbuilding Progress
Payments noted that the guarantee payment frequently is
made an unreasonable length of time after expiration of
the guarantee period. The guarantee payment is defined as
2% of the vessel price. The delivery payment is the amount
withheld from progress payments less the guarantee payment.
However, not until the 688-11 contract were delivery pay-
ments exempt from the percentage of cost ceiling applicable
to total payments. This has prohibited the payment of full
delivery payments in those instances where progress payments
have become cost limited. The DD 963 contract is an example
of this situation. These payments will be included in the




This section would be incomplete v7ithout reference to
the changing nature of the shipbuilding industry. There
has been a significant shift in both the number of major
vessels under construction and the number of private yards
engaged in Navy shipbuilding. The Shipbuilders' Council of
America data indicates that in 1964 there were 14 shipyards
building 83 Navy vessels while by 1974 the number of ship-
yards had dropped to six and the number of vessels to 66.
During this same period merchant vessel construction in-
creased from 49 vessels in nine shipyards to 97 vessels in
nineteen shipyards.
The change in total workload has been accompanied by a
change in the structure of the industry. All but two of
the major private yards have become part of large multi-
division corporations. Capital investment has increased
from $130,000,000 in the period 1964 - 1966 to a projected
$510,000,000 for the 1973 - 1975 time frame. (13). This
change in structure and increase in investment have been
contributing factors leading to increased attention paid
to financial matters such as cash flow, return on investment
and claims against the government. The above factors and
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others are reflected in contract profit rates bid by major
private shipbuilders for the construction of Navy vessels.
Table II
Contract Profit Rates Bid by Major Private
Shipyards as a Percent of Cost
Ship-
yard 1965 '66 '67 '68 '69 '70 71 '72 '73
A 5 5 10.5 10 10
B 5 5 12 12 11 12 12
C 8 5 11.5 10 10 10 13 13 13
D 2.5 2.5 2.5 9 11 10 12
E 5 5 9
F 10 10 10 9
G 5 6 8 10
Source: NAVSEA 01G
Although the above table indicates that a change in policy
concerning profit rates occurred during 1967 - 1968, ship-
builders have testified before the Seapower Subcommittee
regarding the low profitability of their Navy ship con-
struction business. Among other factors, increased demand
for commercial work and low profitability on Navy work have
caused some shipbuilders to adopt corporate policies of
ridding themselves of dependence on Navy contracts. However,
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other yards which have become deeply committed to Navy
work and are, in the words of Litton President Fred 'Green,
"bidding on Navy contracts because we have no choice."
Recent major ship acquisition actions have been received
with little interest on the part of the shipbuilding industry
The AS 39/40 procurement resulted in only one response to
the solicitation. In the AD 40 procurement no response to
the solicitation was received. The FFG-7 Follow Ship solici-
tation, in which the intention was to make awards to three
separate shipyards, resulted in proposals from only three
shipyards. Two of these belong to the same corporation.
On the other hand, the Navy faces a limited number of pri-
vate shipyards qualified to construct nuclear surface ships
and submarines. Present and projected nuclear shipbuilding
is concentrated in only two shipyards; Newport News Ship-
building and Dry Dock Company and General Dynamics' Electric
Boat Division. Newport News maintains the only active
capability to construct nuclear surface ships whereas
Electric Boat, which holds the contract for the first three
TRIDENT submarines, depends entirely upon Navy submarine
construction, conversion, overhaul, and repair work. If
the Navy is to meet its five year shipbuilding goal, it
must recognize the interdependence that exists between it
34

and the three shipyards that presently account for the
majority of Navy vessels now under construction or contract.
This chapter has discussed the development of current
Navy policy which determines, to a large extent, the impact
that inflation will have on profit. Contractor compensation
has been divided into specific classes of payments which in
turn have been identified with applicable policy. The
specific contractural provisions used to implement the





The use of escalation provisions was introduced in
Section A of Chapter II. This chapter will analyze the
mechanics of the escalation provisions used in major ship
acquisitions. A comparison will be made of the escalation
clauses contained in fourteen shipbuilding contracts.
Since 1962 escalation clauses used in Navy shipbuilding
contracts can be classified as one of two types. These two
are referred to as the 1962 standard clause and the 1975
clause or Marshall clause. As noted earlier both clauses
provide fcr price adjustment based upon the cost index
method. Both clauses rely upon two indices published monthly
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) as measures of price
level changes. These indices are referred to as the BLS
material and labor indices.
A. BLS INDICES
The BLS steel vessel material index is made up of three
commodity subgroups of the wholesale price index chosen to
be most representative of shipbuilding. The three subgroups
are weighted on the basis of the breakdown that existed for
a typical commercial ship in 1952. The subgroups and respec-




10-1 Iron and Steel 45%
11-4 General Purpose Machinery 40%
11-7 Electrical Machinery 15%
100%
Since Steel Mill Products comprise 72.47o of the 10-1 sub-
group and, therefore, 33%. of the total, the BLS material
index is sensitive to movement in the price of steel plate.
The BLS labor index is composed of inputs from eighteen
private shipyards. The index is based upon the straight
-
time average hourly earnings reported by the yards . The
shipyards and their respective representation is shown in
Table III as of June 1975. (15).
Table III
































Todd (San Pedro) 3.7
Todd (Seattle) 1.9
Williamette 0.3
B. 1962 STANDARD CLAUSE
Appendix B is an example of the 1962 standard escalation
clause. It should be read by those not faimilar with this
type of clause prior to reading the remainder of this chapter
The 1962 standard clause provides for escalation pay-
ments according to the following formula:
3LS
Escalation payment = BLS Q
x E i x C x TC
where: BLS. is the average value of the appropriate index
for period i.
BLS is the value of the appropriate index for the
base month specified at the time of pricing.
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E. is the percentage of total labor or material
cost apportioned to period i.
C is the labor or material percentage of target
cost subject to escalation.
TC is the target cost.
Separate calculations are made for labor and material. Be-
cause change orders are priced exclusive of the escalation







x E. (labor, material) x C x TC
i=l
where: n is the number of periods of escalation coverage.
The expenditure curves for labor and material (E^) are
determined by the Navy based upon an analysis of the his-
torical data of the anticipated bidders, labor/material
mix, material lead times, and fabrication requirements of
the type of ship. The percent of target cost subject to
escalation (C) for labor and material is exclusive of those
projected overhead costs which are fixed. The expenditure
curves and labor/material mix provided in the solicitation
are, therefore, only an estimation of what will be achieved
by a representative shipbuilder.
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Shipbuilders approach pricing by estimating costs based
on current prices and by taking into account the differences
between their estimates and the government's estimated ex-
penditure curves and labor/material mix. They make adjust-
ments to their bid prices based upon their best judgment as
to the difference between their projection of cost escala-
tion and the amount they expect to be returned in escalation
payments
.
With the exception of sole-source procurements, the
initial labor/material mix and the expenditure curves are
not subject to adjustment during the negotiation process.
If a cost analysis is performed, competition not withstand-
ing, the basis for the contractors' price adjustment may
become an issue for cost negotiations. In the event that
the government is unsuccessful in eliminating this contin-
gency for uncollec table escalation, a negotiating practice
is to exclude the contingency from the target price but
include it in the cost-sharing incentive and ceiling price.
In sole-source procurements the initial labor/material mix
and expenditure curves are subject to negotiation. Addition-
ally, in specific instances modifications have been made to
the labor indices to provide an adjustment for the difference
between the historical performance of the BLS labor index
and the experience of the contractor. As will be noted
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later in this chapter, both the CVAN-68 and the DLGN-38
contracts provide for the adjustment of the BLS labor
indices through the use of a multiplier.
In all cases once the contract is signed the predeter-
mined expenditure values (E., C, and TC) remain fixed for
the duration of the contract and are subject to adjustment
only in the event of partial termination. Because escala-
tion payments under the 1962 standard clause depend on
these predetermined values and the movement of the two BLS
indices they are largely independent of the actual cost
experience of the contractor. This separation of the basis
for making escalation payments from the actual experience
of the contractor was the target of the criticism noted
earlier.
The shipbuilder faces four elements of risk associated
with this method. First, the actual expenditures may occur
at a later time than reflected in the predetermined curves.
This will result in undercompensation for actual escalation
in periods of inflation and overcompensation in periods of
deflation. Delivery delays usually experienced in Navy
shipbuilding underscore the likelihood that expenditures
will occur at a later time than reflected in the predetermined
curves. Second, the predetermined labor/material mix may
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not be achieved. Third, escalation is not paid on costs
incurred between target and ceiling rather only on the pre-
determined percentage of target cost. Fourth, the index
may not reflect the actual price level change experienced by
a particular contractor for a particular ship. The 1975
clause was developed in response to the first three risk
elements
.
The combined impact of these four elements is by no
means clear. For example, undercompensation resulting from
the first three elements could be offset through overcompen-
sation due to the inapplicability of the material index.
Lt. D. D. Geismar, in a thesis entitled "Composition of
Material Price Indices for Naval Ship Contract Escalation,"
compared escalation payments on the DD 963 contract using
both the BLS and an index representative of the unique
material composition of that class vessel. He demonstrates
that for some ships substantial overcompensation or under-
compensation may result if the weighting of individual
components of the BLS steel vessel index is not representa-
tive of the contractors costs. (16).
C. 1975 CLAUSE
The 1975 claase involves the de-escalation of actual
incurred costs to determine both the amount and timing of
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escalation payments. Payments under this method are deter-
mined according to the following formula:
BLS„





where: BLS- is the value of the appropriate index for
period i.
BLS is the value of the appropriate index for
the base month specified at the time of pricing.
AC. is the actual escalatable cost incurred in
period i. (Escalatable cost is defined in the
next paragraph.)
Separate calculations are made for labor and material.
The total escalation payments for labor and material equal:
Tl 15 T O
AC. - AC. x Q (labor, material)
i-1 1 i BLS.
where: n is the number of periods until actual delivery.
As in the 1962 standard clause, the percentage of costs
to be escalated is predetermined. The measurement of fixed
overhead costs for escalation purposes is subject to a high
degree of uncertainty. The result is that fixed costs are
subjectively defined in. the contract as a percentage of
indirect costs. Therefore, escalatable costs are defined
in terms of direct material, direct labor, and a fixed
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percent of indirect costs. The major improvement over the
previous method is that under the 1975 clause escalation
payments are based upon the actual timing of incurred cost
and the payments continue until delivery. The continuation
of escalation payments beyond the contract delivery date,
however, is contingent upon two stipulations. First the
sum of total de-escalated costs and all costs incurred not
subject to escalation may not exceed the ceiling price.
Second a ceiling is placed on the BLS indices at some point
after the contract delivery date. It is anticipated that
the 1975 clause will replace the 1962 standard clause.
D. COMPARISON OF ACTUAL ESCALATION PROVISIONS
The remainder of this chapter will be an analysis of
the escalation provisions contained in the fourteen con-
tracts listed in Chapter I.
Contracts signed prior to and including the 688-11 pro-
vide escalation payments based upon the 1962 standard clause.
The clause contained in the TRIDENT contract represents the
transition between the two methods discussed in this chapter.
The 688-III contract represents the first application of the
1975 clause. However, there have been significant variations
in the application of the 1962 standard clause. Table IV
provides a comparison based upon nine common characteristics.
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One of the major variations among the clauses analyzed
was in the designation of the percentage of costs upon
which escalation would be paid. Costs subject to escala-
tion varied from 100% of actual cost incurred in the 688-111
contract to 79.7% of target cost for the 637-(2) contract.
It should be noted that in the 637-(4) and DLGN-36 contracts
costs subject to escalation are designated as a % of target
price rather than target cost as was the common practice.
Conversion of the escalation base to a percent of target
cost results in percentage of 86.9 and 94.9 respectively.
In two instances separate provisions were included to
provide escalation coverage for a specific element of cost.
Escalation on designated employee benefit program costs in
the CVAN-68 contract was to be paid based upon actual in-
creases in costs with a maximum increase of $1.25 per hour
for the life of the contract. Energy cost elements on the
688
-III contract are excluded from indirect costs and are
covered by separate escalation provisions.
The use of base cost as a means of designating escalat-
able cost in the DLGN-38 contract represented a major
departure in the degree of escalation coverage provided
under the 1962 standard clause. The base cost is defined
as the final projected cost determined under the revised
billing base procedure. Under this procedure, base cost
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was revised quarterly based upon the quotient of total
incurred cost and physical percentage of completion. This,
in effect, provided for the payment of escalation on costs
between target and ceiling. This degree of escalation
coverage was not provided for again until the TRIDENT
contract. Adjustments to the costs covered by the escala-
tion provisions in the TRIDENT contract were not to be made
at regular intervals but when projected final cost was
"substantially greater or smaller than target cost."
Two other contracts containing the 1962 standard clause
provided for adjustment to the costs covered by the escala-
tion provisions. These two were the successive target type
of contract used in the acquisition of the LHA and DD 963.
The escalation clause contained in these two contracts
provided for a one-time adjustment in costs based upon the
establishment of a firm target cost. It should be noted
that these two contracts were the result of Total Package
Procurement and as such are different from the other FPIF
contracts used in ship acquisition.
The TRIDENT contract was the first contract in which
the expenditure curves could be adjusted if the actual ex-
penditures differed substantially from the curves provided.
The CVAN-68 contract did, however, provide for adjustment
of the expenditure curve in the event that the first vessel
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was delivered early. This most likely was a result of the
uncertainty reflected in the delivery schedule. Delivery
of the first vessel was specified to occur within a time
band spanning sixteen months. As a result of the provision
to adjust the expenditure curves the TRIDENT contract was
the first to provide for escalation payments beyond the
contract delivery date.
The DLGN-38 and the CVAN-68 contracts contain provisions
which apply a multiplier of 1.25 and 1.26 respectively to
the BLS labor index. This, in effect, provides for the
payment of the actual increases in labor costs resulting
from increases in rates provided they do not exceed pay-
ments based upon the BLS index as increased by the multiplier
The TRIDENT contract represents another variation in
the application of the BLS indices. The material index
used was cne proposed by the contractor and is comprised of
seventeen wholesale price indices of lower-level BLS
commodities. Initial experience with the index has thus
far shown it to reflect a lower level of price change than
that of the BLS material index for steel vessel contracts.
The frequency of escalation payments has increased from
quarterly to weekly. Although the BLS indices are published
monthly, weekly payments in the 688 -III contract are made
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according to the average weekly escalation measured in the
preceding month.
Prior to concluding this chapter one last subject per-
taining- to escalation remains. This subject is the length
of time between the base month for pricing and the first
escalation period designated in the contract. The first
escalation period normally starts the first month after the
date of the contract. In the DLGN-38 contract however, the
first period was designated as the month following the base
month for pricing. This period varied from one month in
the DLGN-38 contract to eighteen months in the DD 963 con-
tract. This period of time is a direct result of the
contracting process. If an element of profit was included
in the escalation provision this period would be of little
consequence. Given current practice, the length of this
period is a contributing factor in the erosion of profit
as maintained by shipbuilders.
Based upon the above analysis it can be concluded that
escalation coverage has not been provided on a uniform
basis. Generally the coverage provided in contracts with
Newport News has exceeded that of other contractors. The
use of multipliers and other special provisions has resulted
in a situation where for the same contractor similar ele-
ments of cost are afforded different escalation treatment.
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Likewise the increased frequency of escalation payments has
not generally been applied retroactively to other contracts.
This has resulted in a significant variation in the working
capital required to support the particular method of payment
The overriding consideration regarding the impact of
inflation on profit as a result of contractural escalation
provisions is that profit is not included in escalation
coverage. The analysis of contractural provisions continues
in the next chapter with the emphasis on payments provisions
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Navy policy regarding progress payments was introduced
in Section B of Chapter II. This chapter will introduce
the mechanics of the payments provisions used in major ship
acquisitions. A comparison will be made of the payments
clauses contained in fourteen shipbuilding contracts.
A. NAVSHIPS PAYMENTS CIAUSE
As noted earlier, progress payments for all Navy FPIF
new construction contracts have been based upon physical
progress. The 1961 NAVSHIPS payments clause, even if not
actually used, has provided the basic framework for the
clauses contained in these contracts. Due to the impact of
this clause on shipbuilding payments provisions it is re-
printed below as contained in the NAVSHIPS VESSEL FORM
(July 1966).
8. PAYMENTS, -(a) (i) Until such time as the
performance of the contract as a whole is fifty
percent (507o ) complete, the Government, upon sub-
mission by the Contractor of invoices certified
by the Contractor as hereinafter provided, will
promptly make payments on account of the total con-
tract price of ninety percent (90%) of an amount
determined by applying to the total contract price
the percentage of physical progress in the perform-
ance of the contract as a whole as certified by the
Contractor subject to the approval of the Supervisor;
provided
, that no such payment shall be made in an
amount which when added to the total of all payments
previously made exceeds the cost certified by the
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Contractor on the related invoice to have been in-
curred by it in the performance of the contract plus
five percent (5%) of such cost.
(ii) After the percentage of physical progress
in the performance of the contract as a whole has
reached fifty percent (50%) , the Government, upon
submission by the Contractor of invoices certified
by the Contractor as hereinafter provided, will
promptly make payments on account of the total con-
tract price of one hundred percent (1007o) of an
amount determined by applying to the total contract
price the percentage of physical progress in the
performance of the contract as a whole as certified
by the Contractor subject to the approval of the
Supervisor, less five percent (5%) of the contract
price as adjusted; prov ided , that no such payment
shall be made in an amount which when added to the
total of all payments previously made exceeds the
cost certified by the Contractor on the related invoice
to have been incurred by it in the performance of the
contract plus five percent (57o) of such cost.
(iii) Invoices may be submitted semi-monthly or
more frequently if expenditures by the Contractor
warrant and shall be based upon the total contract
price as adjusted from time to time pursuant to the
clause of this contract entitled "Changes." No pay-
ment will be required to be made under this paragraph
(a) upon invoices aggregating less than Five Thousand
Dollars ($5,000)
.
(b) Upon preliminary acceptance of each vessel
and upon the submission of properly certified invoices,
the Government will pay to the Contractor the amount
withheld under paragraph (a) in excess of (i) two
percent (2%) of the contract price for such vessel, as
adjusted by change orders, constituting a performance
reserve; and (ii) an additional reserve for final
settlement of one percent (1%); provided , that such
final settlement reserve shall not exceed One Hundred
Thousand Dollars ($100,000) for the entire contract.
If at any time it shall appear to the Government that
the amount of the performance reserve may be insufficient
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to meet the cost to the Government of finishing any
unfinished work under the contract for which the
Contractor is responsible, or of correcting defects
for which the Contractor is responsible developing
prior to preliminary acceptance or during the guaranty
period of any vessel, the Government may, in making
payments under this clause, deduct or withhold such
additional amounts as it may determine to be necessary
to render such reserve adequate pending adjustment of
the total contract price on account of such additional
unfinished work and defects in accordance with the
clause of this contract entitled "Changes." Any such
additional amounts deducted or withheld on account of
defects developing during the guaranty period of the
vessel shall not exceed the limit of the Contractor's
liability under the clause of the Special Provisions
entitled "Limitation of Contractor's Liability for
Correction of Defects."
(c) The Government shall, at the time of final
settlement, in accordance, with the provisions of
the clause entitled "Final Settlement," pay the Con-
tractor the balance owing to it under the contract
promptly after the amount of such balance shall have
been determined.
(d) The Government may, in its discretion, make
payments prior to final settlement on account of the
reserves established under this clause subject to such
conditions precedent as the Contracting Officer may
prescribe.
The predominant feature of the clause is that the pro-
cedure for determining progress payments is dependent upon
the degree of progress on the total contract. The per-
centage of physical progress is determined according to
procedures of the Ships Acquisition Contract Administration
Manual (SACAM)
. This procedure involves the determination
of physical progress on each vessel under the contract.
The percentage on the total contract is the weighted sum
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of the progress on each vessel. The clause provides for
payment of 907o of progress based upon contract price during
the first half and 100% of progress based upon contract
price less 5%, of contract price during the second half of
the contract. Payments based on 90% of progress preclude
the payment of any profit for those contracts with profit
percentages below 11.1%. The relation of progress payments
to the profit percentage when based upon 907o of progress
is illustrated in Appendix C. -It should also be noted that
progress payments based on 100% of progress less 5% of
contract price are not the same as those based on 95%, of
contract price. Furthermore, total payments are limited
to a percentage of incurred cost. Total payments in this
context refers to any payment resulting from the contract.
This ceiling provides a link between the escalation clause
and the payments clause.
It is important that the implication of the cost limita-
tion on total payments be fully understood. In the above
payments clause total payments may not exceed incurred
costs by more than 5% until delivery of the last vessel.
Therefore the payment of profit will not exceed 5% of in-
curred cost until completion of the contract. The use of
a ceiling on total payments equal to 100% of incurred cost
will, in the above clause, prevent the payment of any
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profit until completion of the contract. A ceiling of 95%
would require the contractor to finance 5% of the construc-
tion cost in addition to any other withholding stipulated
in the payments clause. As will be demonstrated in a later
chapter the ceiling on total payments has a significant
impact upon the payment of profit.
As noted in Chapter II, there have been different inter-
pretations regarding the computation of progress payments.
As stated in the payments clause, invoices submitted in
support of progress payments must contain a certification
that the total of all payments received under the contract
does not exceed the total cost incurred plus five percent
of such cost. In the case of the DLGN-36 contract, Newport
News in February 1971 changed its certification to read
that the total of all payments exclusive of escalation pay-
ments does not exceed the total costs incurred plus five
percent of such costs. The impact of this change in certi-
fication on progress payments can be illustrated through a
hypothetical example. Throughout the example it will be
assumed that total progress payments based upon physical
progress exclusive of any ceiling on payments equals $90.
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Computation of Progress Payments with
Certification that Total Payments do
not Exceed 105% of Incurred Cost
Incurred Costs (Material,
Labor and Overhead) $90.0
Plus 5% 4.5
Maximum Payments Based on Cost Plus 57> $94.5
Less: Escalation Payments to Date $ 10.
Maximum Progress Payments Based on
Cost plus 5% $84.5
Total Progress Payments Based on Physical
Percentage of Completion $ 90 .
In the above example, progress payments would be limited to
$84.5. Combined with prior escalation payments, the total
of all payments would be $94.5 which equals 1057o of cost.
Computation of Progress Payments with
Certification that Total Payments Exclusive
of Escalation Payment do not Exceed 1057.
of Incurred Cost
Incurred Costs (Material,
Labor and Overhead) $90.0
Plus 57, 4.5
Maximum Payments Based on Cost Plus 57> $94.5
Total Progress Payments Based on Physical
Percentage of Completion $90.0




In the above example the contractor certifies that the
total payments exclusive of escalation payments ($100.0
minus $10.0) does not exceed 105% of costs ($94.5). Total
payments would be $100 versus the $94.5 in the previous
example.
Newport News through adoption of this procedure was
able to increase progress payments by almost 4 million
dollars on the DLGN-36 contract. This method of determining
progress payments was later interpreted to be invalid.
Other examples exist which further demonstrate misunder-
standing regarding the calculation of progress payments.
The Task Group to Study Shipbuilding Progress Payments
found that Electric Boat was applying the payments pro-
visions on an individual vessel basis. This in effect
accelerated the receipt of progress payments relative to
those based upon the total contract.
Recently an analysis substantiating a proposal submitted
in response to the FFG-7 Follow Ship Solicitation revealed
that the contractor had failed to apply the cost incurred
ceiling in projecting progress payment receipts. Although
there may be misunderstanding regarding the calculation of
progress payments, there is none regard5.ng the reason for
withholding of some of the earned progress payment.
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The withholding is designed to insure that the con-
tractor maintains an investment in his work-in-process.
The mechanics of the payments clause are easily explained
in terms of this withholding. The 10% withholding during
the first half of the contract provides for the gradual
buildup of investment in work-in-process so that at the 50%
completion point the level of investment has reached 57o of
the contract price. This level is then maintained during
the second half of the contract by withholding 5% of the
contract price. This explanation assumes that the con-
tractor makes favorable progress relative to cost. The
cost limitation provides protection to the Navy against
uncertainty involved in measuring physical progress.
There is, however, disagreement over the measurement of
the contractor's investment in work-in-process . Investment
in work-in-process can be separated into two elements, cash
investment and earned profit. The Navy is uncertain as to
when earned profit should be recognized with the result
that contractor investment is interpreted to be cash invest-
ment. The misunderstanding regarding earned profit and
cash flow is best illustrated in the following contradictory
sentence contained in a letter to the Navy Comptroller from
one of the Systems Commands.
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Establishment of an upper limit not to exceed
100% of incurred cost plus earned profit to in-
sure that no positive cash flow would result
from cumulative progress payments.
Studies such as the Task Group to Study Shipbuilding Pro-
gress Payments have adopted cash flow as a measure of invest-
ment. This approach ignores completely the concept, of
earned profit.
Shipbuilders follow the practice of the construction
industry and book profit based upon progress during the
total life of the contract. They are quick to point out
the tax liability resulting from profit that has been booked
but not paid. They maintain that the current asset repre-
senting booked profit which has not been paid is an invest-
ment that is no different than the purchase of material
which is then billed to a specific contract. From the
Navy's viewpoint the former would not be considered invest-
ment in work-in-process while the latter would.
A problem of greater concern on the part of the Navy is
the uncertainty that surrounds the final contract price.
The premature payment of profit was a major concern in the
development of current policy regarding progress payments.
The uncertainty as to final contract price is the result
of the cost-sharing incentive provision. Since progress
payments are initially based on target price, unfavorable
61

physical progress relative to cost will have a serious
impact on contractor investment and thereby endanger his
ability to perform unless an upward adjustment is made to
the contract price. One method to remedy this problem is
the revised billing base procedure referred to in section
D of Chapter III.
B. REVISED BILLING BASE
The revised billing base procedure is a provision con-
tained in the payments clause which provides for the quarterly
adjustment of the billing base. The billing base prior to
the first quarterly adjustment is the contract price.
Adjustments in the billing base are for the purpose of
making progress payments and do not affect the determination
of the final contract price. The revised billing base is
determined according to the following formula:
Revised Billing Base = Projected Final Cost + Projected Profit
where:
Incurred Costs - Escalation Payments
Projected Final Cost = —
% Physical Progress
The maximum projected final cost is limited to
the contract ceiling price.
Projected Profit is the profit based upon the
projected final cost as determined under the
Incentive Price Revision Clause.
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The above explanation represents the generalized case. The
exact procedure for determining the projected final cost
varies depending on the escalation clause contained in the
contract.
The revised billing base is the price from which progress
payments are calculated. Thus the revised billing base pro-
cedure provides a systematic method by which the cost in-
centive is applied to the projected final cost in order to
determine the price upon which to make progress payments.
The revised billing base procedure has been used in only
three contracts, the CVAN-68, DLGN-38, and 688-111, all with
Newport News. The predominant method for making adjustments
in the billing price is through a provision contained in the
incentive price revision clause which provides for negotia-
tion of a change in the billing price when it can be demon-
strated that the final cost will be substantially different
than target cost. Negotiated changes in billing price occur
on an infrequent basis. The revised billing base procedure




C. COMPARISON OF ACTUAL PAYMENTS PROVISIONS
The remainder of this chapter will consist of a compari-
son of the payment clauses contained in the fourteen con-
tracts listed in Chapter I. A comparison based upon common
characteristics is provided in Table V.
The CVAN-68, DLGN-36, LHA and 688-III contracts provide
for payments based on an individual vessel basis. This
resulted in exempting delivery payments from the 1057o cost
ceiling in the CVAN-68 and DLGN-36 contracts. The LHA
payments clause, however, was written such that the ceiling
on total payments was applicable to all payments made under
the contract. Starting with the 688-11 contract the ex-
clusion of delivery payments from the cost ceiling became
a permanent provision of the payment clause.
The payment provisions when applied on an individual
ship basis increases total progress payments during the
first half of the contract. This is not the case in the
CVAN-68 contract as payments are based on 95% of progress
for the entire contract. The exception to the use of the
NAVSHIPS payment clause in the CVAN-68 contract is due to
the high unit price and length of the contract. The LHA
contract also contained a unique modification to the
standard payments clause. Payments during the first forty
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months were to be based upon incurred costs. Payments
after the forty months were to convert to a percentage-of-
completion basis.
The NAVSHIPS payments clause was modified in the DLGN-36
contract to provide payments on an individual vessel basis
as a result of a reduction in target price. This contract
did not contain the revised billing base procedure. It
was unique in that payments were initially based upon
ceiling price rather than target price.
The area of greatest variability has been in the ceiling
on total payments. The increased concern over progress pay-
ments is reflected in the use of a ceiling on total payments
of 1007o incurred costs during the first half of the
DLGN-38 contract. Although the recommendations of the Task
Group were not implemented until March of 1973, the impact
is clearly visible in the payment ceiling of 95% of incurred
costs used in the AOR-7 contract. The 688-11 was the first
major new construction contract signed after the change in
payments policy implemented in SECNAVINST 7810.11 However,
as noted in Chapter II the Navy was unsuccessful in imple-
menting this policy. Payments in the 688-11 contract were
based upon physical progress with a payments ceiling of 957o
of incurred costs as proposed by the Naval Ships Systems
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Command. The use of the 95% ceiling required that the
payments clause be written to exclude delivery payments
from the ceiling on payments. Without the exemption of
delivery payments, the ceiling would have prohibited the
payment of profit until completion of the contract. This
is the case in the AOR-7 contract, however, this contract
involves the construction of only one ship.
In the TRIDENT submarine procurement, the low offeror
would accept a fixed-priced contract only if the progress
payments were based on percentage-of-completion. The in-
crease in the payments ceiling to 100% of incurred costs
resulted from the major investment in facilities required
to perform the contract and the working capital implication
of a 95% ceiling. An exception to the SECNAVINST 7810.11
was requested for the 688-III procurement. A ceiling of
100% of incurred costs was requested in order that the
limitation on payments be identical to the TRIDENT contract
SECNAVINST 7810.11 was cancelled and progress based pay-
ments with a payment ceiling of 100% of incurred costs
for the first half of the contract and 105% thereafter were
authorized. Under the new policy the 105% cost ceiling on
progress payments is contingent upon the contractor's
ability to demonstrate the contract will result in a
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profit of at least 5%. This provision is to reduce the
risk of premature payment of profit. The 688-III contract
provides payments in accordance vzith this new policy.
The analysis of the payments clauses shows that varia-
tions which provide a more favorable level of progress
payments have predominantly been incorporated in contracts
with Newport News. Additionally, the above comparison
demonstrates that the impact of the changing payments
policy can be traced through the various payment thresholds
used in the individual contracts.
The most significant factor relevant to the impact of
inflation on profit is that the payment provisions provide
for the payment of little or no profit during the first
half of the contract. The profit profiles generated by the
procedure outlined in Chapter VI will demonstrate this.
The actual payment thresholds in conjunction with the
length of the contract are therefore significant factors
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Chapters III and IV have provided an analysis of the
contract clauses that determine how and when the contractor
is compensated. This chapter begins the analysis of going-
in-profit on FPIF shipbuilding contracts. First, a brief
overview will be given of defense profit policy. This will
be followed by a comparison of the profit objectives con-
tained in those fourteen contracts whose escalation and
payments clauses have been subject to examination in pre-
vious chapters.
A. PROFIT POLICY
Defense profit policy is applicable only to negotiated
contracts. It does not apply when price competition exists,
since in these instances the contract is awarded to the
offerer with the lowest total price, all other factors being
equal. In those procurements involving price competition,
the government relies on market forces to determine the
level of profit. In the absence of price competition,
both of the elements of contract price, cost and profit,
are determined through negotiation. ASPR section 3-808
contains a set of "weighted guidelines" which are to be
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used by contracting officers in establishing a profit
objective as part of their overall negotiating position.
The level of profit is determined by applying the negotiated
profit percentage to the negotiated elements of contract
cost.
Section 3.808.1(a) of ASPR includes the following policy
statement regarding profit:
It is the policy of the Department of Defense
to utilize profit to stimulate efficient contract
performance. Profit generally is the basic motive
of business enterprise. The Government and defense
contractors should be concerned with harnessing
this motive to work for more effective and economi-
cal contract performance. Negotiation of very low
profits, the use of historical averages, or the
automatic application of a predetermined percentage
to the total estimated cost of a product, does not
provide the motivation to accomplish such performance.
Furthermore, low average profit rates on defense
contracts overall are detrimental to the public
interest. Effective national defense in a free
enterprise economy requires that the best industrial
capabilities be attracted to defense contracts.
These capabilities will be driven away from the
defense market if defense contracts are character-
ized by low profit opportunities. Consequently,
negotiations aimed merely at reducing prices by
reducing profits, with no realization of the func-
tion of profit cannot be condoned.
However, the importance placed on the profit motive on
an individual contract basis appears to be in conflict with
the role expressed for profit in ASPR 3-806 regarding cost,
profit and price relationships:
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...government procurement is concerned primarily
with the reasonableness of the price which the
government ultimately pays and only secondarily
with the eventual cost and profit to the contractor.
There has been much criticism of the use of the "weighted
guidelines" in the negotiation of profit. An often stated
criticism is that the "weighted guidelines" give little con-
sideration to the amount of capital investment required
from the contractor. Both the GAO and LMI in studies of
profits in the defense industry have concluded that in-
equities in return on investment have resulted among con-
tractors providing differing proportions of capital required
for contract performance.
A fundamental issue in the controversy over the use of
"weighted guidelines" is whether a method of determining
profit as a percentage of cost is an adequate concept of
profit. Within the private sector, company management is
responsible for generating a return on investment which is
satisfactory to both stockholders and lenders. They,
therefore, relate profit to capital investment. The rela-





Capital Investment Sales Capital Investment
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The ratio of profit/sales is called the profit margin
while the sales/capital investment ratio is the capital
turnover. The above formula, frequently called the return
on investment formula, illustrates that profit/capital
investment is dependent upon both the profit margin and
the capital turnover.
When profit is determined as a percentage of cost and
does not reflect investment, the contractor can increase
profit on capital investment in one of two ways: first by
increasing sales volume, and second by minimizing invest-
ment. The GAO report on profits concluded that by relating
profits to costs there is little incentive to invest in
equipment which would increase efficiency and reduce costs.
The current "Profit 76" study reflects the concern of
the Department of Defense for the impact of profit policy on
contractor investment. One of the stated objectives of the
study is to assess the opportunities for cost reduction
investment and examine the relation of earnings to such
investment
.
There have been others within the defense establishment
that have based their criticism on other factors. For
example Gordon Rule, Director of the Procurement Contract
and Clearance Division within NAVMAT in a letter to




I would like to make a suggestion re defense
profits generally. It is my opinion that we need
a better method of profit determination than
presently provided by the weighted guidelines
method in ASPR 3-808. All too often do we, in
reviewing negotiated contractual arrangements,
find that the negotiators are agreeing on an
overall price and then "backing into" some figures
to put on the form. As practiced, it can be very
phony
.
Moreover, I do not feel the basic concept of
the WGL is practical in that we are not smart or
wise enough to intelligently recognize and properly
evaluate risks which is the basic touchstone of the
WGL theory.
On 11 December 1972 the Department of Defense in Defense
Procurement Circular 107 established a revised method for
determining prenegotiation profit objectives by specifically
recognizing contractor capital employed in contract perform-
ance. Under DPC 107, 50% of the prenegotiation profit
objective is determined by using the "weighted guidelines"
and 50% is determined by return on investment on allocated
capital. This revised method was authorized on a trial
basis and, therefore, may be applied only by mutual agree-
ment. However, the price thresholds of contracts to which
this policy may be applied precludes its application to
major shipbuilding contracts. Its application in other





The predominate contract type used by the Navy in the
acquisition of ships is the fixed-price incentive fee. In
an incentive contract there are three types of incentive
parameters which may be used: cost, schedule, and perform-
ance. The straight cost incentive has received the widest
application within shipbuilding and will be the only type
discussed in this chapter. The cost incentive is specified
in the Incentive Price Revision Clause. It is simply an
arrangement whereby the contractor's profit increases or
decreases as his actual base costs fall below or above the
contract target cost. The use of cost incentives is an
attempt to incentivize cost control by the contractor,
while reducing the contractor's risk due to the uncertainty
of estimated cost.
The essential characteristics of a fixed-price incentive
fee contract are: target cost, target profit, ceiling price
and the sharing ratio. The DOD/NASA Incentive Contracting
Guide states that "...target cost should present an equal
probability of cost over target or under target." (18).
The ceiling price is the maximum amount for which the govern-
ment will be liable. The sharing ratio, frequently referred
to as the share line, is the government-to-contractor cost
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sharing arrangement by which any difference between the
estimated and actual cost is absorbed. The cost incentive
may consist of a single or multiple sharing ratio. A
specific cost range is designated for each sharing ratio
used.
Figure 2 is an example of a cost/profit diagram for a
hypothetical fixed price incentive fee contract. The 70/
30 sharing ratio below the target cost results in an addi-
tional $.30 of profit for each dollar that the actual base
cost is below the target cost. The 80/20 sharing ratio
results in a reduction of $ . 20 in profit for each dollar
that final base cost exceeds target cost. The intersection
of the 0/100 share line originating from the ceiling price
and the 80/20 share line is called the Point of Total
Assumption (PTA) . It is at the point of total assumption
that cost sharing ceases and the contractor absorbs all
additional cost growth. The PTA, therefore, determines the
range of cost sharing above target cost.
The following formula may be used to calculate the
point of total assumption for cost sharing arrangements in-
volving a single sharing ratio above target cost:
„„.. Ceiling Price - Target Price
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The calculation of PTA cost for sharing arrangements in-
volving multiple sharing ratios is discussed in the DOD/
NASA Incentive Contracting Guide.
The cost at PTA in Figure 2 is $237.50. The range of
cost sharing above target is from $200 to $237.50. The
example cost/profit diagram illustrates graphically that
the PTA depends upon three parameters: Target Profit,
Ceiling Price and the cost sharing above target. A change
in any one of these three parameters will result in a
different PTA cost.
The above discussion demonstrates that the analysis of
profit in incentive type contracts would be incomplete
without consideration of the cost sharing arrangement.
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a compari-
son of the profit and cost sharing incentives contained in
shipbuilding contracts.
C. PROFIT OBJECTIVES FOR SELECTED CONTRACTS
Table VI provides a listing of the percentage profit
rates and sharing ratios for the fourteen sample contracts.
The ceiling price and PTA are both expressed as a percentage




Any conclusion derived from the contents of Table VI
must take into consideration that each cost sharing arrange-
ment reflects the particular procurement and individual
contractor. This difficulty can basically be overcome by
concentrating on contracts involving similar ship types.
1. 637 Class Submarine Procurements
The last two procurements of the 637 class submarine
provide a perspective from which to view the 688 class sub-
marine procurements . The appropriate data from Table VI
for these two contracts is listed below.
Contract/Date
Sharing Ratio Below Target
Above Target
Ceiling as % Target Cost
PTA as % of Target Cost











-(2) contract was awarded to Newport News on
the basis of price competition and without consultation
with the respective offerers. This may account for the
lower profit percentage and small cost sharing range rela-
tive to the 637-(4) contract with Electric Boat. Both
contractors had substantial experience in the construction
of this class vessel.
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2 . 688 Class Submarine Procurements
The appropriate data from Table VI for the four
follow-on contracts is listed below.
688-III 688-11 688-1 688-1
Contract/Date 8/75 NN 10/73 EB 1/71 EB 1/71 NN
Sharing Ratio
Below Target 70/30 70/30 70/30 70/30
Target to 1.11 TC 1.0256 TC Ceiling Ceiling
95/5 85/15 70/30 70/30
To Ceiling To Ceiling
85/15 70/30
Ceiling as %
Target Cost 133.2 123.1 116,0 110.8
PTA as % of
Target Cost 122.4 115.4 105.9 101.2
7o Profit @
Target Cost 13.0 11.9 11.9 10.0
The procurement of the first flight of 688 class
submarines was split between Newport News and Electric Boat.
Although these contracts were for a new class of submarine,
the range of cost sharing is significantly smaller than on
the 637-(4) and 637-(2) contracts. The second and third
flight procurements, however, are characterized by the use
of multiple sharing ratios which increase from 85/15 and
70/30 in the 688-11 contract to 95/5 and 85/15 in the
688-III contract. In addition to the increased government




3. DLGN 36 & 38 Procurements
The appropriate data from Table VI for the two
DLGN contracts is listed below.
Contract/Date
Sharing Ratio Below Target
Target to
Ceiling as % Target Cost
PTA as % of Target Cost



















The cost sharing incentives in the DLGN-36 and
DLGN-38 contracts reflect the opposite use of multiple
incentives than in the 688 procurements. Although these
vessels are not of the same class they are very similar
and represent successive construction. The multiple shar-
ing incentive in the DLGN-36 contract provides for a larger
government cost share and a greater sharing range than on
the DLGN-38 contract.
It is assumed that the sharing ratio and the range of
sharing reflect the relative cost uncertainty associated
with FPIF contracts. The increasing cost uncertainty
reflected by the cost sharing incentives in the 688-11 and
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and 688-III contracts is opposite to what intuitively would
be expected in follow-on contracts. At least this is counter
to what was found to be the case in the two 637 class sub-
marine procurements and the two DLGN procurements. One
explanation is that the increased uncertainty in cost is
due in part to a higher rate of inflation and concern re-
garding escalation coverage on the part of the contractor.
The cost sharing incentives in the 688-11 and the 688-III
contracts could represent attempts to isolate from contractor
cost performance the potential impact of inflation not
covered by escalation. This practice was noted in Chapter
III section B. The use of cost sharing ratios in the
TRIDENT contract that are identical to those in 688-III
support this possible explanation.
A comparison of the profit percentages on those con-
tracts with only Newport News and Electric Boat does not
reveal a discernible pattern. The 688 contracts may indi-
cate an increase in profit rates, but this observation
rests primarily on the rate in the 688-III contract which
is 13.0%.
Figures 3-14 are the cost/profit diagrams for all but
the LHA and DD963 contracts. A theory advanced by a pro-
curement contracting officer is that contractors are more
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concerned with profit at PTA than at target cost. Accord-
ing to this theory contractors negotiate terms which will
provide a minimum acceptable level of profit at PTA. Profit
at PTA would, therefore, represent a lower bound on profit.
Profit at PTA which is greater than the minimum acceptable
level would reflect the relative success of the contractor
in the negotiation process. This theory represents a simple
view of corporate motivation and is not based upon the tradi-
tional profit maximization motive. As a check on the
validity of this theory the profit per vessel at PTA was
compared in those contracts involving multiple procurements.
The 688 procurements support the validity of this theory,
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate that the profit per vessel at PTA
in the 688 first flight contracts is almost: identical even
though the profit percentage and sharing range are different,
Furthermore the same measure for the contracts in the first
two flights exhibits little variation. The profit per
vessel at PTA in the 688-III contract, however, is almost
double that of the preceding four contracts. As is evident
from Figure 7 this increase is due to the increased govern-
ment cost share in the cost sharing incentive.
Likewise, the profit per vessel at PTA in the DLGN
contracts, Figures 8 and 9, are similar. Although this
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neither proves or disproves the theory it does strengthen
its credability.
The analysis of profit objectives thus far has not
addressed the question of when the profit is to be received
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Although target profit is expressed in terms of a per-
centage of target cost, the respective purchasing power of
a dollar of profit and a dollar of cost are not equal.
Target profit as stated in the contract is the sum of a
potential stream of profit without regard to the time value
of money. Any further analysis of profit, therefore, re-
quires that profit be examined in terms of when it is to be
received. This chapter will describe how profit profiles
for selected contracts were developed.
A. ESTIMATING PROGRESS
The development of a profit profile for a contract re-
quires the estimation of progress. As will be demonstrated,
an estimation of progress can be related to estimated ex-
penditures over time by equating physical progress with
cost progress. As discussed in Chapter III, the 1962
standard escalation clause contains estimated expenditure
curves of escalatable cost for both labor and material.
These provide a reasonable basis for estimating progress




Use of the expenditure curves contained in the escala-
tion clause requires that an adjustment be made to reflect
those costs excluded from escalation coverage. As noted
earlier these excluded costs generally represent less than
10% of target cost. It was assumed that these costs were
incurred in direct proportion to escalatable costs. Per-
centage-of-completion was estimated according to the
following formula:
Li +Mi
Percentage-of-Completion in Quarter i =
Tl ( L i + M i }
i=l
Where: M. is the % of target cost subject to escalation
adjustment as material cost in quarter i.
L. is the % of target cost subject to escalation
adjustment as labor cost in quarter i.
n is the total number of quarters in the labor
expenditure curve.
In order to substantiate the validity of this method
of projecting progress, a comparison was made against the
actual incurred cost for the 637-(4) contract. This data
had been collected for use in the Study Report of Escalation
in Navy Contracts. This study formed the basis for the
development of the 1975 Clause.
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Several adjustments to the data were required in order
to arrive at a meaningful comparison. The technique des-
cribed above to estimate progress is based upon constant
dollars whereas the incurred costs represent inflated
dollars of cost. The incurred cost breakdown consisted of
quarterly costs for labor, material, and overhead. Since
the exact split of overhead costs into labor and material
was unknown it was not possible to express the incurred
costs in terms of constant dollars. The alternative was
to escalate the estimated contract costs according to the
escalation clause. The quarterly adjustment for escalation
was determined by using the actual BLS steel vessel indices
for labor and material. The quarterly escalation adjust-
ment was then combined with the product of target cost and
the estimated quarterly percentage-of-completion. The
quarterly costs based upon estimated progress and escalated
in the above manner provide an equivalent basis for com-
paring estimated and actual cost progress.
One additional adjustment was required to account for
contract changes reflected in the incurred costs. These
costs could be treated as if they occurred at the end of
the contract or throughout the entire contract. The adjust-
ment to incurred costs for contract changes was based on
103

the former assumption. The assumption that costs resulting
from contract changes are the last to be incurred would, if
anything, overstate the actual cost progress.
Table VII provides a comparison of estimated progress
and actual cost progress as adjusted in the preceding para-
graphs .
Table VII
Comparison of Estimated and Cost






















Although statistical goodness of fit measures were not
found to be appropriate, Table VII demonstrates that for
this contract the method of estimating progress provides a
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good approximation to progress based upon incurred cost.
The differences which occur during quarters three through
six are not considered serious, as variations prior to 507o
completion have little impact on the profit profile. It is
the author's opinion that this method will, if anything,
overestimate progress. This opinion is based upon (1) the
fact that the progress based on incurred cost is generally
less than the estimated progress; and (2) the expenditure
curves were a good approximation of incurred cost even with
the vessels delivered early and at less than target cost.
B. CONTRACT MODEL
Initially, the author had planned to use a contract fi-
nancing simulation model developed by Lt. Stephen Olson to
project profit profiles. However, lack of access to propri-
etary data necessary to fully utilize its capabilities plus
the need to correct what the author considered deficiencies
in the model led to the rejection of this plan. Deficiencies
in the Olson model arise from the way in which payments are
determined. Progress payment thresholds are applied to base
costs rather than incurred costs, and there is no differen-
tiation as to delivery and guarantee payments.
In order to measure the impact of changes in progress
payments procedures, projections of net investment as well
as profit were required. Net investment is defined as
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total incurred cost less total payments. All costs were
treated as though they resulted from cash expenditures. A
computer program was written to provide quarterly values
for net investment and profit. The program was based upon
the following algorithm:
1. Compute quarterly escalation
2. Compute estimated percent progress
3. Compute total incurred cost
4. Compute total payments
5. Compute net investment and profit
6. Print quarterly results.
Each step in the algorithm will be discussed.
1. Compute Quarterly Escalation
The quarterly escalation adjustment was determined
according to the escalation clause contained in the particu-
lar contract using either published BLS steel vessel indices
or NAVSEA 01G projections of BLS indices made 15 July 1975
for future periods. The NAVSEA projections reflect the
following annual percentage price level change, although they
are made on a monthly basis:
Calendar Year
75 76 77 78 79 80
Labor 14.4 10.0 8.7 3.1 6.2 6.2
Material 8.9 12.1 10.4 7.4 6.9 6.6
2
.
Compute Projected Percent Progress
The projected percentage-of -completion is calculated




3. Compute Total Incurred Cost
As noted earlier in this chapter, incurred costs
refer to inflated costs. Total incurred costs are determined
by adding the cumulative quarterly escalation adjustments
to the product of target cost and the estimated percentage
of completion.
4 • Compute Total Payments
To project the impact of changes in progress pay-
ments procedures, payments were calculated according to
six different sets of payment thresholds actually contained
in shipbuilding contracts. The thresholds are differentiated
according to the cost limitation on total payments and
whether delivery payments are excluded from this limitation.
The six thresholds are as follows:
Payments ceiling as Payments ceiling as Delivery payments
7> of incurred cost % of incurred cost exempt from cost








The above thresholds are portrayed chronologically to
show the response to changes in progress payment policy.
Progress payments subject to the above thresholds are based
upon 907, of progress prior to 507, completion and 1007, of
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progress thereafter less 5% of the contract price. Delivery
payments are equal to 3% of vessel price and guarantee pay-
ments equal to 2% of vessel price. A reserve for final
settlement of $100,000 is withheld from the delivery payment
of the first vessel and is paid upon expiration of the
guarantee period for the last vessel. A guarantee period
of eight months was assumed commencing upon deliver)''.
Escalation payments are based upon the adjustments
calculated in step one. Escalation payments equal the
escalation adjustment subject to the cost incurred limita-
tion on total payments
.
The exemption of delivery payments from the 95% and
1057o cost incurred ceiling requires the determination of
the amount of escalation adjustment attributable to each
delivered vessel. The use of the escalation clause to
inflate cost provides incurred costs on a total contract
basis only. The amount of escalation adjustment attribu-
table to each complete vessel was approximated by applying
the percentages for the individual vessels determined from
the projected escalation contained in the NAVSHIPS 7303-17
Reports of the cost of each vessel.
5 . Compute Net Investment and Profit
As previously defined, net investment is the differ-
ence between incurred cost and total payments received. Net
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investment was determined as of the end of each quarter by
subtracting the total of all payments from total incurred
costs. The profit received each quarter was the amount by
which quarterly payments exceeded quarterly cost,
6. Print Quarterly Results
In addition to the net investment and profit, the
percentage-of-completion and total escalation adjustment
were printed for each quarter of the contract. The format
of the printout is as follows:
Quarter Complete Escalation Net Investment Profit
C. GENERATION OF SELECTED CONTRACT PROFIT PROFILES
Profit profiles were generated for the following seven
contracts
:









These contracts were selected on the basis of achieving a
broad span of contract dates, variety of length of perform-




Profit profiles were generated for each contract based
upon each of the six thresholds described earlier using the
series of index values specified in the escalation clause.
One additional profile for each contract was generated based
upon the payment thresholds contained in the payment clause
and the projected BLS steel vessel indices used in the 688-11
contract. This was accomplished by adjusting the escalation
clause dates such that the first quarterly period was coin-
cidental to that of the 688-11 contract. These profiles
were useful in making comparisons based upon the same index
value
.
Excluding payment thresholds, and with three exceptions,
the profit profiles were based upon the provisions of the
escalation and payments clauses contained in the contract.
The first exception is that progress payments in the DLGN-36
contract were based upon target price, not ceiling price.
The second exception is that in this same contract progress
payments were computed on a total contract basis rather
than on an individual vessel basis. The third exception is
that the labor multiplier was not used in determining the
escalation adjustment in the DLGN-38 contract.
The profit profiles generated under the various conditions
stated above are contained in Appendix C. In the next chapter
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various measures will be applied to these profiles in order
to determine the impact of the payment thresholds as well
as the erosion of purchasing power due to inflation.
Ill

VII. MEASURES OF PROFIT EROSION
As noted in Chapter IV profitability is primarily
measured in terms of return on investment. The use of this
measure was precluded by lack of access to information
regarding contractor investment. Additionally, uncertanties
would have resulted from the allocation of investment in
facilities to specific contracts as well as the determina-
tion of the working capital requirements of the contract.
The cash flow analysis required to accurately determine the
working capital requirements for a particular contract is
not a simple matter or a subject that is well understood.
It is the author's opinion that the Navy's capability
for conducting a cash flow analysis is limited. This opin-
ion is based upon a review of the cash flow statements
required to be submitted by the contractor in support of
the progress pa3>ments on the 688-III contract. Furthermore,
contractors are very reluctant to provide data regarding
their cash flow.
The erosion of profit was first measured in two separate
ways. Unlike return on investment which relates profit to
investment, these measures relate the value of profit to
time in different ways. First, the profit profile was
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deflated by the consumer price index to determine the
erosion in the purchasing power of profit. Second, the
erosion of profit was measured in terms of the time value
of money by discounting the profit profile at 15%. By
assuming independence, the combined impact of these two
separate measures was determined by discounting the deflated
profit profile at 15%. Because of the method used to esti-
mate progress, discounting the profit profile will tend, if
anything, to understate the impact of changes in payment
procedures. Recall from Chapter IV that the method of
estimating progress would tend to overstate progress.
A. PURCHASING POWER EROSION OF PROFIT
In their statements regarding profit erosion, ship-
builders frequently stress the reduction in the purchasing
power of profit resulting from inflation. The measurement
of the reduction in purchasing power requires the use of a
measure which reflects changes in price levels. From the
stockholder's perspective, the consumer price index is the
measure most frequently used to indicate relative purchasing
power. The consumer price index was, therefore, selected
as a measure by which to deflate each profit profile. The
profit for each quarterly period was expressed in terms of




Total Deflated Profit 2_ Pi x
i=l ACPI.
Where: P. is the profit for quarter i.
CPI is the value of the consumer price index for
the base month of the coiitract.
ACPI is the average value of the three monthly
consumer price indices for quarter i.
n is the number of quarters in the profit profile.
The following annual percentage change in the consumer
price index was assumed for future periods:
Calendar Year
1976 1977 1978-81
Percent Change 7.8 6.6 5.2
The sum of the deflated profit for each profit profile
expressed as a percent of target cost, is listed in Table
VIII. The impact of the six payment thresholds are illus-
trated for each contract. The erosion in purchasing power
can be made on a contract to contract basis by making com-
parisons within each payment threshold category. Table
VIII illustrates that the profit percentages for the seven
contracts as based on the actual thresholds contained in
the payments clause have declined when measured in terms
of purchasing power. Furthermore, comparisons within each
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of the payment threshold categories illustrate this same
declining trend in profitability. (See rows of Table VIII.)
Table IX illustrates the percentage reduction in target
profit based upon the profit percentages contained in Table
VIII. This removes the variation due to the negotiated
profit rate encountered when making comparisons of the dis-
counted profit percentage. Table IX illustrates the in-
creased erosion of profit relative to preceding contracts.
More important, however, is the relationship of erosion of
profit in terms of purchasing power to the reduction in
profit percentage resulting from escalation payments. The
latter measure is also frequently used by shipbuilders to
substantiate their statements regarding profit erosion. The
erosion of profit as a result of escalation payments can be
measured by the reduction in target profit to target cost
percentage when escalation payments are combined with target
cost. This measure appears as the first category of
Table IX. It can be seen that the erosion of profit accord-
ing to this measure, regardless of thresholds, is less than
the erosion as measured in terms of purchasing power for
each threshold category. The fact that profit is generally
received only during the last half of the contract because




As noted in Chapter VI, a profit profile was generated
for each contract based upon the indices used in the 688-11
contract. This was to provide a comparison of profit based
upon the same indices. The deflated profit as a percent of
target cost based on the thresholds contained in the pay-
ments clause of the respective contract for both the actual
and adjusted escalation period are listed in reverse
chronological order below:
688-1 688-1
688-11 DLGN-38 (EB) (NN) 637-(2) 637-(4) DLGN-36
actual 6.90% 9.06% 8.06% 7.09% 7.78% 9.15% 10.35%
688-11 indices 8.63% 7.58% 6.53% 6.85% 7.86% 8.85%
The above percentages further illustrate the impact of the
increased rate of inflation particularly in the area of the
earlier contracts.
Thus far consideration has not been given to the cost
of financing associated with the increased investment re-
sulting from the use of the 95%. cost incurred limitation
on total payments. To reflect the cost of this increase,
a quarterly interest charge was computed based upon the
prime interest rate in effect at the start of each quarter.
This assumes that the shipbuilder is able to borrow at the
prime interest rate and that there is no compensating balance
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associated with this line of credit. The quarterly interest
charge will, therefore, tend to understate the cost of the
additional investment required. The prime rate assumed to
be in effect for future periods is as follows:
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Prime Rate (Percent) 7.0 6.4 6.0 5.0 5.0
Source: Presidential Budget FY 1976
The quarterly interest charge was subtracted from the
quarterly profit and the deflated profit determined as
described previously. Table X lists the total interest
charges and the deflated profit percentages resulting
from this treatment of the additional investment resulting
from the 95% payment thresholds.
The difference in the deflated profit percentages
between the 105%/ 105%. non-exempt and the 957>/95% exempt
payment thresholds given this treatment of investment cost
is as follows:
688-11 DLGN-38 688-1 688-1 637-(2) 637-(4) DLGN-36
(EB) (NN)
0.67% 1.06% 1.06% 1.03% 0.87% 0.67% 0.7%
The principle cause of the above variation is the high level
of the prime interest rate for the period July 1973 to March
1975. Restating the above difference as a percentage reduc-
tion in the deflated profit percentage based upon the 1057>/
105% non-exempt payment thresholds results in the following:
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688-11 DLGN-38 688-1 688-1 637-(2) 637-(4) DLGN-36
(EB) (NN)
9.2% 11.67o 13.2% 14.5% 11.2% 7.3% 6.8%
These percentages reflect the reduction in terms of profit
associated with the change in payments policy relative to
the seven contracts.
B. DISCOUNTING AT 15%
An alternative measure of profitability is provided by
the present value of the profit profile. Differences in
the present value of profit on account of payment thresholds
represent the opportunity cost associated with changes in
payment policy. It should be noted that this measure of
profitability does not involve the explicit treatment of
inflation but rather measures the time value of money.
An important consideration in computing the present
value of profit is the selection of an appropriate interest
rate. A rate of 15% per year was selected. The selection
of this rate is not without justification as will be seen.
The payments clause in the DLGN-36 contract, as noted in
Chapter IV, was modified to provide for payments on an
individual vessel basis. The contractor reduced the con-
tract price by $120,000 to achieve this modification. The
principle effect of this change was to exempt the delivery
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payment for the first vessel from the ceiling on total
payments. The 1057o/1057o exempt thresholds were used to
approximate the profit profile for this contract. The
difference between the present value based on the 15%
interest rate for the profit profiles generated under the
105%/1057o non-exempt and the 1057,/1057> exempt thresholds
is $118,000. It is the author's opinion that the price
reduction offered by the contractor was based on this type
of analysis.
The present value of each profit profile was computed




Where: i is the number of the respective quarter.
P. is the profit for quarter i
r =V 1 ' 15
n is the total number of quarters in the contract.
The present value is expressed in terms of the month in
which the contract was signed. Additionally, no adjustment
was made for financing costs.
Table XI lists the present value of each profit profile
The percentage reduction in present value between the 1057>/
1057o non-exempt and the 957o/957o exempt thresholds for each
contract is as follows:
119

688-11 DLGN-38 688-1 688-1 637-(2) 637-(4) DLGN-36
(EB) (NN)
10.5% 9.6% 9.1% 8.8% 7.7% 8.5% 9.9%
These percentages reflect the reduction in terms of profit,
when measured by present value at 15%., associated with the
change in payments policy relative to the seven contracts.
Table XI indicates that the payment threshold of 1007o /
105% exempt, reflecting the current payments policy provide
a present value that is larger than that of the 105/105 non-
exempt thresholds. This same fact is illustrated in terms
of profit percentage in Table VIII. Therefore, it can be
concluded that the current payment policy, from the con-
tractors viewpoint, is preferable to the policy in effect
prior to the change in March of 1973.
The present value of profit at 15% expressed as a per-
centage of target cost for the profiles based on the actual
payments clause thresholds for each contract are as follows:
688-11 DLGN-38 688-1 688-1 637-(2) 637-(4) DLGN-36
(EB) (NN)
4.89% 6.04% 5.73% 5.20% 5.46% 6.49% 7.55%
The decreasing profitability indicated above is caused by
the length of the contract, the negotiated profit, and the
payment thresholds. Removal of the effect of the difference
in payment thresholds, however, does not change the trend of
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declining profitability as illustrated below:
688-11 DLGN-38 688-1 688-1 637-(2) 637-(4) DLGN-36
(EB) (NN)
5.45% 6.13% 5.73% 5.20% 5.46% 6.49% 7.46%
The declining profitability is consistent with that shown
by the previous measure of profitability used in this
chapter.
A sensitivity analysis was not performed by determining
the present value at lower rates of interest. The method
of deflating profit is mathematically similar to the dis-
counting technique and thus provides an indication of the
results that would be obtained by discounting at lower
rates of interest.
C. DISCOUNTING DEFLATED PROFIT AT 15%
The two previous measures have associated profit erosion
from two separate considerations regarding the receipt of
profit over time. These two , deflation and time value of
money, can be combined by assuming they are independent
measures. The present value of deflated profit was computed
according to the following formula:
CPI




Where: i is the number of the respective quarter.
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P. is the profit for quarter i
r - ">y 1.15
CPI is the value of the consumer price index for
the base month of the contract.
ACPI . is the average value of the three monthly
consumer price indices for quarter i,
n is the total number of quarters in the contract.
Table XII lists the present value of the deflated profit
profile at 15% interest in terms of a percent of target
cost. The percentages for the 95%/95%> non-exempt and the
957>/95% exempt threshold categories have been adjusted for
the interest charge described earlier. The profit per-
centage based upon the present value of deflated profit at
157> interest for the actual payments clause thresholds for
each contract are as follows:
688-11 DLGN-38 688-1 688-1 637-(2) 637-(4) DLGN-36
(EB) (NN)
2.67% 4.25% 3.98% 3.72% 4.33% 5.26% 6.06%
This combined measure shows not only the declining trend in
profitability, but the dramatic extent to which profit is
eroded. These figures illustrate that the concern of ship-





There are two conclusions of major significance that
can be made based upon the three measures of profitability-
used in this chapter. These conclusions are as follows:
1. The current payments policy is preferable, relative
to the payment of profit $ than the policy that
existed prior to March of 1973.
2. Profitability of the seven contracts measured
relative to time has declined.
In the following chapter three approaches for reducing the
erosion of profit due to price level change will be dis-
cussed. Failure to address this problem will result in
shipbuilder's negotiating higher contract profit rates or
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This paper has identified those contractual provisions
which determine the impact of inflation on contract profit.
It can be argued that shipbuilders take into account the
erosion of profit as a result of these provisions when
establishing a contract profit objective. This, in effect,
represents a form of contingency pricing. This method is
satisfactory providing the erosion of profit can be accurately
predicted and the negotiated profit percentage adjusted
accordingly. The decline in profit as measured in Chapter
VII illustrates that shipbuilders have either underestimated
the degree to which profit is eroded or have been unsuccess-
ful in negotiating profit percentages to preclude the decline
in profit relative to other contracts. This result of con-
tingency pricing if continued will have serious consequences
on the Navy's shipbuilding program.
An alternative to contingency pricing is the use of
escalation provisions. The Navy, as one of the major users
of escalation provisions, has long recognized the advantage
resulting from the use of escalation provisions in ship-




This same advantage can result from the application of
escalation provisions to profit. The escalation of profit
is not incompatible with the use of the "weighted guidelines"
procedure, which do not provide for the explicit treatment
of the timing of the payment of profit in establishing a
negotiating profit objective.
There are three general approaches to the application
of escalation provisions to profit. These general approaches
are: (1) include an element of profit in existing cost
escalation provisions, (2) escalate actual profit earned
upon completion of the contract, and (3) separate escalation
of target profit. Each of these general approaches will be
discussed.
A. INCLUDE ELEMENT OF PROFIT IN EXISTING COST ESCALATION
PROVISIONS
This method encompasses the recommendations, noted in
Chapter II, of the Logistics Management Institute and the
Council of Defense and Space Industry Associates. The
administrative consideration associated with the application
of this method to the 1975 escalation clause is negligible.
A separate element of profit would be included in the esca-
lation payment based upon the application of a predetermined
percentage to the separate calculations made for the
adjustment based upon labor and material.
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The strongest argument used against this method of
providing escalation coverage to profit is that it may be
prohibited by ASPR due to the ban on cost plus percentage
of cost contracts. The essence of this argument is that
the inclusion of an element of profit in cost escalation
payments somehow results in a cost plus percentage of cost
contract. In the author's opinion the above argument is
indicative of a misunderstanding of the basis for making
escalation payments.
The rationale for this approach remains based upon the
percentage of cost method of determining profit. This
method represents an attempt to equate profit to a per-
centage of forward-priced costs. It is the author's
opinion that the strongest reason for not adopting this
approach is illustrated in Chapter VII. The timing of
receipt of escalation payments over the life of the con-
tract is significantly different than that of the receipt
of profit. If the purpose of providing escalation on pro-
fit is to maintain the purchasing power of target profit
,
then this method contains a serious deficiency.
131

B. ESCALATE ACTUAL PROFIT EARNED
This approach represents the method envisioned in the
last paragraph of Appendix A. It involves the use of a one-
time adjustment based upon the application of an appropriate
index to the profit actually earned at completion of the
contract. A profit profile would be constructed based upon
an analysis of costs incurred and payments received to
determine the actual payment of profit on a quarterly
basis. The adjustment would be calculated based upon the
following formula:
n




Where: P. is the profit paid in quarter i (note P. cannot
be less than zero.)
I . is the average value of an appropriate index
for quarter i.
I is the value of the index at the time the con-
o
tract is signed.
n is the number of quarters until the contract is
completed.
The administration of this method, although not as
simple as the previous approach, is not difficult. The
primary weakness of this method is that it provides
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escalation only on earned profit. This would result in
different treatment of contractors based upon cost perform-
ance. For example, those contracts which resulted in a
loss or zero profit would receive no adjustment. The
advantage of this method is that it would maintain the
purchasing power of the percentage of target profit actually
earned. This method, however, is contingent upon the con-
tractor's willingness to wait until completion of the
contract for the adjustment. Present value theory says
that the contractor would be willing to accept a reduced
amount at an earlier point in time.
C. SEPARATE ESCALATION OF TARGET PROFIT
The separate escalation of target cost could be accom-
plished through the use of a predetermined profit profile
reflecting the percentage of target profit projected to be
paid in each quarter of the contract. The profit profile
would be based upon the thresholds in the payments clause
actually contained in the contract. The use of a predeter-
mined profit profile is required because the actual payment
of profit over time cannot be determined until the contract-
is complete.




Quarterly Payment = P. x _i
Where: P. is the product of target profit and the percent-
age for quarter i contained in the predetermined
profile.
I. is the average of the appropriate index for the
quarter i.
I is the value of the index on the date the con-
o
tract is signed.
These payments, unlike the adjustment provided in the
preceding approach, would be made outside of the incentive
price revision formula, as are cost escalation payments.
Additionally, like cost escalation payments they would be
terminated when the sum of total payments less total escala-
tion payments equaled ceiling. The advantage of this approach
is that all contractors would be afforded equal treatment.
Additionally, the payment of the adjustment would be con-
sistent with the payment of profit anticipated at the out-
set of the contract.
All three of these approaches are compatible with con-
tractual provisions currently in use. It should not be
assumed, as is 1 implied in Appendix A, that the use of any
of these approaches would result in extra profit in all
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cases. The contractor, particularly in competitive pro-
curements, will adjust his proposal price based upon his
projection of profit. Providing escalation coverage to
profit will deny the contractor the excuse for including a
contingency in his profit objective to offset the erosion
of profit as a result of inflation.
These approaches present three options for reducing
the erosion of profit as a result of inflation. It is
the author's opinion that they are presented in increasing
order of preferability . It is recommended that one of






From: Commandern Naval Sea Systems Command
To: Chief of Naval Material
Subj: Profit Objectives on Shipbuilding Contracts
1. The issue discussed in your memorandum of 17 April 1975
raises a provocative question which is difficult to answer.
Although we have some thoughts on the matter, which will be
expressed below, it seems that the issue has such broad
ramifications that it should be pursued at the BOD level.
All Services must use Economic Price Adjustment provisions
to some extent, . Therefore, there should be a consistent
Service wide approach, if a workable technique can be devel-
oped to recognize profit on escalation recovery.
2. After much deliberation, we have concluded that there is
no apparent way to produce more profit through escalation
recovery generated by the Sconomic Pric Adjustment clause
used in Shipbuilding contracts, especially if they are pro-
cured competitively. In competitive procurements, contractor
selection is based on comparisons of the proposed target
prices. For whatever the motivation, if a contractor chose
a low profit rate, we would not Question its reasons. A
real examole of such a thing happening is in the overhaul
of the DLG-10, where Bath's cost estimate was lower than
Boland's, but because Boland oroposed a lower profit rate,
its target price was lower than Bath's. Therefore, it
would not be logical to unilaterally tack on extra profit to
excalation recoveries, when the low offeror had no expectation
of receiving such a bonus. It is appropriate to note that
most of our major ship acquisition programs which invariably
use escalation provisions, are competitive.
3. In a sole source procurement, the situation is different,
as profit on excalation could be computed. However, it
would be inconsistent to allow additional profit in a sole
source situation, where, presumably, the contractor will get
a higher "going-in" profit, but not allow for extra profit
in a competitive procurement where the risk is the same.
4. Implicit in your inquiry is the assumption that low pro-
fitability is caused by the exclusion of escalation from the
base for profit computation, yet there is no known study which
would bear this out. Possibly, the DOD "Profit 76" study will
address this issue. Further, in keeping with the stated profit




costs to the fullest extent practicable to contractors, we
would recommend against a policy which would allocate profit
to a contract condition designed to minimize contingency
pricing.
5. A conceot we have considered is to, in some manner, es-
calate realized profit by applying a 3LS index to compensate
for the erosion of profit dollars caused by inflation over








ARTICLE 8. COMPENSA TI ON .ADJUSTMENTS (LABOR AND MATERIAL)
(a) Regardless of the actual changes in the cost of
labor or materials during the performance of this contract,
adjustments in comoensat i on shall be made as orovided in
paragraphs (b) and (c) of this Article. Said adjustments
are based solely on the changes in the Labor Index identified
in paragraph (b) of this Article .and the Material Index identi
fied in paragraph (c) of this Article. Each Supplemental
Agreement entered into pursuant to this Article shall set
forth the calculations upon which the adjustments in com-
pensation are made. For the purposes of this Article,
33.0/Q of the Target Cost shall be deemed to constitute the
labor cost subject to adjustment and shall be apportioned
as shown in the second column of Table 1 of paragraph (b)
hereof. Similarly, 61 . Cfo of the Target Cost snail be deemed
to constitute the material cost subject to adjustment and
shall be apportioned as shown in Lhe second column of Table
2 of paragraph (c) hereof. No part of said Tables 1 and 2
shall be revised, unless this contract is partially terminated
and then only as provided in subparagraph (f) (2) of this
Article.
(b) Adjustments in compensation on account of changes
in labor cost shall be made as follows for each quarterly per-
iod shown in the first column of Table 1 for this paragraph
based on the changes in the Nationwide "Index of Changes in
Straight Time Average Hourly Earning for Selected Shipyards"
(June 1962 equals IOC) for steel ship construction herein
sometimes called the "Labor Index", furnished to the Kaval
Shin Systems Command by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the
United States Department of Labor?
(1) The Labor Index for the base month of April
1972 shall be subrracted from the Labor Index for the quarter-
ly oeriod involved, determined in accordance with paragraph
(d) below, and the difference computed as a plus or minus
figure, as the case may be.
(2) The aforesaid difference, whether plus or
minus, shall be divided by the Labor index for the base month
and the resulting quotient carried to four decimal places,
(3) The aforesaid quotient shall be multiplied i
by the percentage of the Target Cost set forth in the third
column of Table 1 below, opposite the quarterly period in-
volved, and the resulting product carried to six decimal
places
.
(4) The aforesaid product shall be multiplied by
^(Target Cost). The resulting amount shall constitute the





(5) The amount of the adjustment in comoensation
shall be upwards or downwards depending upon whether the
difference in the labor indices calculated in subparagraph
(1) above is a plus or minus figure, as the case may be, and
shall be set forth in a Supplemental Agreement to this con-
tract.
MATSrtlAL 61. 0$ of Target C ost LABOR 33.0$ of Target Cost
/o of % of %, of % of
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(c) Adjustments in comoensation on account of changes In
material costs shall be made for each quarterly period shown in
the first column of fable 2 below, based on the changes in the
"Material Indcjx for Naval Ship Systems Command Steel Vessels
Contract", herein sometimes called the "Material Index", fur-
nished to the Naval Ship Systems Command by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics of the United States Department of Labor;
(1) The Material Index for the base month of April
1972 below, shall be subtracted from the Material Index for the
quarterly oeriod involved, determined in accordance with
paragraoh (d) below, and the difference computed as a plus or
minus figure, as the case may be.
(2) The aforesaid difference, whether plus or minus,
shall be divided by the Material Index for the base month and
the resulting quotient carried to four decimal places.
(3) The aforesaid quotient shall be multiplied by
the percentage of the Target Cost set forth in the third column
of Table 2 below, Opposite the ouarterly period involved, and the




(4) The aforesaid product shall be multiplied by
^(Target Cost). The resulting amount shell constitute the
amount of the adjustment in compensation for the quarterly
period involved.
(5) The adjustment in comoensation shall be uowards or
downwards depending uoon whether the difference in the material
indices calculated in accordance with subparagraph (1) above is
a plus or minus figure, as the case may be, and shall be set forth
in s Supplemental Agrement to this contract.
(d) For the purpose of this Article:
(1) The first quarterly period shall commence on
the first day of the calendar month following the effective
date of the contract.
(2) The term "Target Cost ", as referred to herein, shall
be the target cost in effect at the effective date of this con-
tract.
(3) For the ourposes of computing the amount of adjust-
ment in compensation the amount of Target Cost set forth in sub-
paragraphs (b) (4), and (c) (4) shall not be revised unless this
contract is partially terminated and then only to the extent
provided in paragraph (f) (2) of this Article.
(4) The Labor Index and Material Index for a quarterly
period shall be the arithmetical average carried to one
decimal point of the Labor Index, or the Material Index, as the
case may be, for each of the three months comprising such
quarterly period.
(e) Nothing contained in this Article shall be con-
strued as prohibiting the inclusion of changes in the cost of
labor or material in any adjustment in the target cost, target
profit, target price, ceiling price or tot
vided for under any other provision of thi
f al final price pro-
s contract.
(f) (1) If this contract is terminated in whole, for any
reason, no compensation shall be made under this Article for any
quarterly oeriod subsequent to the quarterly period during which
the contract is terminated.
(2) In the event that this contract Is terminated in
part, and such oartial termination terminates the completion of
one or more vessels then, notwithstanding any other provision
of this Article, the target cost set forth in oaragraphs (b)
and (c), the percentages of target cost set forth in paragraph
(a), and each column of Table I of paragraph (b) and Table 2
of paragraph (c) shall be adjusted for the reduction in the number




Deferred payments for escalation shall be oaid promptly, upon
submission of invoices, whenever such payment, when added to the
total of all payments previously made under the contract, would
not exceed ninety-five percent {95%) of the costs certified by
the Contractor on such invoice to have been incurred by it in
the performance of the contract. Upon delivery of the last vessel
under this contract, any remaining deferred payments for
escalation shall, upon submission of invoices, be promptly paid.
In the event that the amount shown in any Supplemental Agreement
pursuant to paragraphs (b) and (c) above is a minus figure,
such amount shall be deducted from the next invoice(s) pre-
sented for payment under this contract until such amount has been
offset or recouped in full.
(h) No adjustment shall be made in the target cost, target
price, or ceiling price on account of upwards or downwards adjust-
ment in compensation made in accordance with this Article and
hence said adjustments are outside the incentive price revision
formula provided for in Article 8, "INCENTIVE PRICE REVISION
(FIRK TARGET)." Accordingly, even if the ceiling price is
exceeded, amounts otherwise payable to the Contractor in accord-
ance with this Article shall continue to be paid.
(i) Any dispute arising under this Artile shall be
determined in accordance with provisions of the "DISPUTES"





upon 90;% of Progress as
a Function of Percent
Profit
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